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The Story of Seventeen Tasmanians:  
the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre and Repatriation  
from the Natural History Museum   
 Dr Chris Davies* and Kate Galloway**
I Introduction 
The Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre (TAC) has been involved in 
a legal battle with the Natural History Museum in London in 
regard to possession of the remains of 17 Tasmanian Aborigines 
which the Museum has had in its possession since the 19th 
Century. While the Museum has recently agreed to repatriate 
the remains, it still seeks to DNA test some samples taken 
from the remains. For present day Tasmanian Aborigines, 
this is viewed as representing a degrading violation of 
Aboriginal cultural and spiritual beliefs.1 The TAC is therefore 
maintaining its stance to try and prevent the tests taking place. 
This has created opposition from even within the Aboriginal 
community, with some claiming that the money spent on this 
battle could be better spent on other needs of the Aboriginal 
community.2  
*    Senior Lecturer, School of Law, James Cook University (Townsville).
**  Lecturer, School of Law, James Cook University (Cairns).
1   Matthew Denholm, ‘A bone to pick with the Brits’, The Weekend 
Australian, 17 February 2007, 17; see also Lyndon Ormond-Parker, 
‘Aboriginal Remains Return Home’ [2003] Indigenous Law Bulletin 23.
2   Matthew Denholm and Peter Wilson, ‘Museum bones legal fight a 
waste of $1m’, The Weekend Australian, 24 February 2007, 1. Note that 
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Even though remains have been repatriated, the case has 
raised many issues: moral and ethical, as well as legal.  Legal 
issues include what property rights may exist in the remains; 
the legal right to a burial; legal requirements in relation to the 
carrying out of tests on human tissue; legal requirements in 
regard to repatriation, and even in this case, the question of 
the administration of estates. Some would argue that there 
is a clear moral and ethical argument that the study of a 
unique people (like the Tasmanian Aborigines) enhances our 
understanding of humanity, and therefore must override the 
desires of a relatively few number of people. This is balanced 
by the counter-argument that such testing not only infringes 
cultural beliefs, but also smells of 19th century imperialism 
that saw people like the Tasmanian Aborigines treated as little 
more than curiosities.3 
This paper will examine some of these issues, but first it will 
look at the background of the Tasmanian Aborigines who are 
now involved in the case. 
II The Human Remains from Tasmania
A The Aborigines of Tasmania: A Brief History 
Aborigines entered Tasmania across the land bridge that 
 
 
 there are two groups who identify as being Aboriginal in Tasmania. 
One are those who are the descendants of the Tasmanian Aborigines 
taken to the islands in the Bass Strait in 1835, or who were living on 
those islands after becoming the wives of European sealers. This group 
is known as the Palawa and are associated with the TAC. The other 
group, known as the Lia Pootah, describe themselves as the descendants 
of the Aborigines who remained on mainland Tasmania as servants, or 
who managed to remain on mainland Tasmania in small tribal groups: 
see Denholm, n 1 above, 17. It is the Lia Pootah who are claiming that 
the legal action is a waste of money. 
3   For instance, one of the skulls in the group is known as ‘Lady Franklin’s 
skull’ due the fact that it was given as a memento in 1838 to Lady 
Franklin, the wife of the Governor of Van Diemen’s Land, as Tasmania 
was then known. See Prof Norman Palmer (chair), Report of the Working 
Group on Human Remains (2003) 24 (Department of Culture, Media and 
Sport (UK)).   
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existed between present day Tasmania and the mainland 
from around 43,000 to 14,000 years ago, with the oldest site 
in south west Tasmania dating back 40,000 years.4 Tasmania’s 
Aborigines are considered to be distinct from the Aborigines 
of mainland Australia, both culturally and biologically. The 
biological differences are linked to the genetic drift that 
occurred after 14,000 years of isolation when Bass Strait was 
formed by rising sea levels.5  These differences include curly 
hair, darker skin and a small stature: the males, on average, 
being 160cm, and females 152cm.6  
Traditional Tasmanians spent most of their time living in small 
bands of around 40-50 people from around 10 families, moving 
over an area extending some 500-800km. Their lifestyle was 
therefore that of a nomadic people, and except when there 
was an abundance of a particular food source, like seals or 
muttonbirds, the bands rarely stayed more than two days in 
the same place. Bands would come together for these and other 
seasonally abundant foods, and also to hold ceremonies and 
arrange marriages. The women usually married men outside 
their own band, but within their own tribe. Estimates of the 
population put it at around 4 000 at the time of European 
settlement, one person per 10-12 km2, though it varied from 
one per 6km2 on the coast to one per 20 km2 in the inland parts 
of the island.7 
Culturally, the Aborigines of Tasmania were distinguished from 
mainland Aborigines by their small number of implements, 
with their only weapons being spears, clubs and stones. 
All up they had just 15 implements, compared with 60 in 
temperate mainland Australia, and 120 in the tropical regions. 
In Tasmania there were no dingoes to help the Aborigines 
with their hunting, the dingo only having reached mainland 
 
 
4   Josephine Flood, The Original Australians: The Story of the Aboriginal 
People (2006) 71.
5   Ibid 63.     
6   Ibid 62. 
7   Ibid 65-6
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Australia well after Bass Strait was formed.8 For a mainly 
coastal people they had curiously stopped eating fish some 
3 500 years ago, with Flood suggesting that this may have 
been due to a major poisoning episode, possibly involving 
ciguatera, a poison naturally occurring in algae and plankton 
which may then build up to toxic levels in the large fish that 
are consumed by humans.9 
The first Europeans to live in Tasmania were sealers who 
began hunting in Bass Strait in 1798. These sealers traded with 
the local Aborigines, with goods and dogs for hunting being 
exchanged for, amongst other things, Aboriginal women. 
It should be noted, however, that reports indicate that the 
women appeared content living with the sealers, later resisting 
attempts to take them away.10 
The first permanent European settlement was established in 
1803, east of the Derwent River, followed by the site of present-
day Hobart in 1804.11 More significantly for the Aboriginal 
population, in 1807 seven hundred settlers arrived, most of 
them ex-convicts. This saw the beginning of increased tension 
between the Aborigines and the Europeans which only 
heightened as the numbers of Europeans increased from 2000 
in 1814 to around 12 000 by 1824.12 
With increasing conflict and deaths of European settlers, 
attempts were made to force all Tasmanian Aborigines into the 
south eastern peninsula. When this failed, missions were set 
up in places like Flinders Island and Bruny Island.13 However 
disease was either killing off the population, or leaving the 
adults sterile, and by 1830 there were almost no Aboriginal 




9   Ibid 71. 
10   Ibid 76. 
11   Ibid 77-78. 
12   Ibid 81. 
13   Ibid 86.  
14   Ibid 90. 
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estimated 15015 and some 40 years later on her death in 1876, 
Truganini was proclaimed the last Tasmanian Aborigine. 
Present day Aboriginal Tasmanians who rightfully claim 
Aboriginal heritage, dispute this description. Truganini’s 
body was acquired by Hobart’s Royal Society Museum, where 
it was displayed from 1904-47. It was only reluctantly given 
up by the museum when forced to by legislation in 1975. Her 
remains were subsequently cremated.16 
The treatment of Truganini’s body is indicative of the treatment 
of remains of Aboriginal Australians over two centuries and 
continues to reflect the attitudes towards remains of indigenous 
peoples. The story of Truganini’s remains also assists our 
understanding of the issues at stake for TAC in 2007 in regard 
to the remains of the 17 Tasmanian Aborigines.
B The Present Day 
The remains of the 17 Tasmanian Aborigines formerly held in 
the Natural History Museum were either donated to, or bought 
by the museum.  There were 16 adults and one boy: four of the 
adults have been identified as female, three as male, with the 
gender of the remaining nine being unknown.17 
The UK Report of the Working Group on Human Remains highlights 
the issues for Tasmanian Aborigines in relation to repatriation 
of human remains, such as those being held in the Natural 
History Museum. The Report looks into the relevance of the 
method of removal of remains in determining whether this 
was relevant to the issue of interpreting consent for scientific 
research.  In response, the TAC submitted that:
Nor is the argument of legitimate acquisition sound.  This 
is just hiding behind a technicality in the case of Tasmanian 
material.  It may have been donated to you or purchased 
by you on your side of the ocean, but on our side it was 
plundered, stolen and taken by deceit from powerless people  
 
 
15   Denholm, above n 1, 17.
16   Flood, above n 4, 91. 
17   Denholm, above n 1, 17.   
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preyed on at their most vulnerable time.  It was not you [ie 
museums] that did it but you still have the spoils and they 
were not properly acquired.18
This highlights the fact that the acquisition of the remains 
coincided with imposition of colonial rule, cultural imperialism 
and denigration of Indigenous people and their culture based 
on an ideology of superiority of the colonists.19 The Report 
further points out that the ‘psychological and arguably the 
physical and social health of these communities [remains] 
damaged’.20  
The Report notes the arguments made to the Working Group 
in a 2002 submission on behalf of Tasmanian Aborigines for 
the ‘unconditional return of all Aboriginal human remains to 
Aboriginal people’, and that ‘prior approval from traditional 
owners’ should be obtained before further research.21 In the 
UK context then, the concerns of the Tasmanian Aborigines in 
relation to ancestral remains are extensively documented as 
part of a formal review process.
Responses by the Museum to the Tasmanian Aborigines’ 
submission denied that there was any mandate to speak for 
repatriation.22 One submission held that ironically the total 
genocide of Aborigines in Tasmania meant that demands for 
repatriation of Tasmanian remains were ‘empty’.23 As will 
be seen later in this paper, Australian law at least impliedly 
rejects this position.
These ideas help to contextualise the demands made by the 
TAC for the return of the 17 Tasmanians which, in turn, raises 
legal issues concerning property rights and the human body.  
18   Report of the Working Group on Human Remains, above n 3, 151-2.
19   Ibid 28-9.
20   Ibid 16.
21 Ibid 51.
22   Ibid 52.
23   Ibid 38.
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III  The Legal Issues 
A  Property Rights and the Human Body 
It has long been held by the courts that there is no property in 
a corpse, confirmed in Australia by Doodeward v Spence.24  In 
an earlier United States case, Pierce v Proprietors of Swan Point 
Cemetery,25 Potter J stated that: 
Although … the body is not property in the usually recognised 
sense of the word, yet we may consider it as a sort of quasi 
property, to which certain persons may have rights, as they 
have duties to perform toward it, arising out of our common 
humanity.  But the person having charge of it cannot be 
considered as the owner of it in any sense whatever; he holds 
it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may from 
family or friendship have an interest in it, and we think that 
a court of equity may well regulate it as such, and the change 
the custody if improperly managed.26 
This statement was cited with approval by the English Court 
of Appeal in Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority,27 which 
also reiterated the old principle that there was no property 
in a corpse. This centuries-old law has been recently applied 
in Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc28 where the 
New York Court of Appeal said that ‘Coke’s classic edict [that 
a corpse has no value] is of more than historical interest; it has 
been a staple of the common law’.29
In Colavito, the US Court of Appeals30 also considered the 
question of whether the kidney of a deceased, promised to the 
plaintiff by the widow of the deceased, was capable of being 
the subject of a claim for conversion in circumstances where 
it had been given away to another patient. The court accepted 
 
24   (1908) 6 CLR 406, 419 (Higgins J). 
25   14 Am Rep 667 (1872). See citation in Smith v Tamworth City Council 
(1997) 41 NSWLR 680, 691 (Young J). 
26   Ibid, 681. 
27   [1996] 4 All ER 474. 
28   (2006) 8 NY 3d 43.
29   Ibid 50.
30   (2006) 438 F 3d 214.
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that there was no property in a corpse save the right of the 
next of kin to possess it for burial, but questioned whether 
application of this rule by the common law could establish 
a ‘public policy against finding property rights in donated 
organs’.31 In terms of an argument based on property in the 
organ, the court stated that:
 
[P]laintiffs such as Colavito are not using the term “property” 
as a legal fiction upon which to base a claim for emotional 
harm.  They have – or assert that they have – a practical use 
for the organ, not a sentimental one.32
In answering the questions certified by the US Appeals Court, 
the New York Appeals Court reviewed the cases relating 
to recovery of body parts after death. It found the common 
theme was ‘the concept of decent burial for an undesecrated 
body’.33 The court then added that it had ‘been careful about 
characterizing causes of action that impose liability for violating 
these sensibilities. In all instances, we have disclaimed any 
reliance on a theory of property rights in a dead body’.34
The Court ultimately found no basis on which to ‘forecast 
the circumstances in which someone may conceivably have 
actionable rights in the body or organ of a deceased person’35 
finding that the plaintiff had no enforceable right to the kidney 
as it was in any event histo-incompatible with his antibodies.
In spite of the common law presumption against property in 
a corpse and the New York Appeals Court’s sidestepping the 
issue of property in parts of a corpse, it is possible to establish 
proprietary interests in a corpse in certain situations. In 
Doodeward v Spence for instance, which involved the possession 
of a preserved body of a child that had been born with two 
heads, it was held that such possession was not unlawful if 
 
 
31   Ibid 224.
32   Ibid 225.
33   (2006) 8 NY 3d 43, 52.
34   Ibid.
35   Ibid 53.
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the body possesses attributes that mean its preservation may 
afford valuable or interesting information or instruction,36 
that differentiate it ‘from a mere corpse awaiting burial’.37 It 
was also suggested in this case that there may be property in a 
mummy due to the skill of the embalmer having turned it into 
something else.38 
Interestingly from the perspective of the 17 Tasmanians, 
Higgins J in dissent pointed out that in the case of a mummy, 
‘the dead body has been buried in foreign soil, in a country 
where British law does not prevail, where the common law 
doctrine as to burial and Christian burial does not apply’.39 
On the basis that ‘there is no one interested in insisting that 
the mummy shall not be disturbed’,40 the mummy apparently 
is capable of being property. The case of the 17 Tasmanians 
tests the assumptions made in Higgins J’s judgment.
B  The Right to a Burial
The legal right to a burial is separate from the issue of the 
property rights in regard to a corpse.  In Smith v Tamworth 
City Council,41 a case involving a burial rights dispute between 
the biological and adoptive parents of the deceased, Young J 
pointed out it was an issue that was complicated by a number 
of factors.  One was that the common law had nothing to do 
with the burial of bodies under English law as this was left 
to the ecclesiastical courts,42 though the right of burial was 
a common law right, not a mere ecclesiastical right.43 This 
then caused problems in Australia which does not have such 
courts. 
 
36 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 413-4 (Griffith CJ).
37   Ibid, 414. 
38   Ibid, 422 (Higgins J). See also Roger Magnusson, ‘The Recognition of 
Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue in Common Law Jurisdictions’ 
(1992) 18 Melbourne University Law Review 601, 603-7.  
39   Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 422 (Higgins J).
40   Ibid 423.
41   (1997) 41 NSWLR 680.
42   Ibid 685. 
43   Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 422.
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His Honour noted that the estate was liable for the payment 
of burial after administration had been granted, which meant 
that, as a consequence, ‘the burial right is often held to be the 
property of the estate’, and that ‘a burial … descends to the 
heirs as intestate property’.44  
Young J also referred to Polhemus v Daly45 stating that:
while there is no right of private property in a dead body in the 
ordinary sense of the word, it is regarded as property so far as 
to entitle the next of kin to legal protection from unnecessary 
disturbance and violation or invasion of its place of burial.46  
His Honour then held in favour of the adoptive parents in 
regard to the issues of the case. 
Thus, this duty to dispose of the deceased’s body can be 
considered to be in the nature of public duty that carries with 
it an enforceable right of possession of the body.47 In regard 
to the case of the 17 Tasmanian Aborigines, the repatriation 
can be seen as a precursor to a subsequent right to conduct a 
burial.  
C  Repatriation and the Law
Property rights, as such, have not in the past been the basis of 
repatriation,48 with the repatriation in the present case arising 
from an agreement from the Natural History Museum to do 
so, despite its initial reluctance, subject to the provision that 
the previously mentioned tests were carried out first.  
Independent of property rights, dealing with human tissue, 
including remains in the UK, is covered by the Human Tissue 
Act 2004 (UK).  While this Act provides for the storage and 
 
 
44   Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680, 687. 
45   296 SW 442 (1927).
46   Ibid 444; Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680, 691.  
47   Magnusson, above n 38, 609.  
48   Chris Davies, ‘Property Rights in Human Remains and Artefacts and 
the Question of Repatriation’, (2004) 8(1) Newcastle Law Review 51, 57.  
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use of material from a deceased person with consent, this 
only applies in respect of material less than 100 years old.49 
These provisions, therefore, do not apply to the remains of the 
17 Tasmanian Aborigines. 
The Act provides for repatriation of human remains to a 
certain extent, but again independently of the question of 
property rights.  Arising out of the 2000 UK-Australia joint 
declaration,50 s 47 of the Human Tissue Act permits the ‘Trustees 
of the Natural History Museum’ to:
transfer from their collection any human remains which they 
reasonably believe to be remains of a person who died less 
than one thousand years before the day on which this section 
comes into force if it appears to them to be appropriate to do 
so for any reason.  
Significantly, however, there is no compulsion to return the 
remains, with ‘non-statutory’ guidance being provided by the 
department administering the Act in the form of the Guidance 
for the Care of Human Remains in Museums.51  
The Report of the Working Group on Human Remains,52 which 
preceded the enactment of the Human Tissue Act, provides 
an overview of the English legal position and acknowledges 
the grey legal area regarding property in human remains.  In 
addition, it raises the possibility of the application of human 
rights principles under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).  The 
Human Tissue Act, however, seems to approach the issue of 
repatriation in terms of neither property rights nor human 
rights, but rather to grant discretion to the institution to 
transfer remains based on much broader, non-legal principles. 
Such an approach, it should be noted, is supported by the 
Guidance.  
49   Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) s1(4).
50 Referred to in Guidance for the Care of Human Remains in Museums, below 
n 51, 5.
51   Department of Culture, Media and Sport (UK), Guidance for the Care of 
Human Remains (2005).
52   Above n 3.
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While the Australian government is supportive of attempts 
at repatriation53 existing Australian legislation only goes 
so far as to protect ‘areas and objects in Australia and in 
Australian waters’. 54  Thus, the question of repatriation raises 
a jurisdictional question, with responsibility falling on the UK 
parliament, rather than any Australian parliament, to decide 
what should be done with any Australian remains in British 
museums.  
It should also be noted that even within Australia, while 
legislation provides protection for any Aboriginal remains 
that are found today,55 this does not extend, in general terms, 
to material that is presently in Australian museums.  An 
exception to this is the Museums (Aboriginal Remains) Act 
1984 (Tas), which states that all the Aboriginal remains in the 
possession of the Tasmanian Museum and the Queen Victoria 
Museum are ‘vested in and become property of the Crown’.56 
This then allowed the Minister to serve notices on the trustees 
requiring delivery of the remains to the elders of the Tasmanian 
Aboriginal community. There was therefore at least partial 
recognition, by one Australian parliament, of traditional rights 
in regard to these particular Aboriginal remains.
In light of an application to the Tasmanian Supreme Court,57 the 
approach taken by TAC has, so far, sought to have the remains 
treated as property. This then raises issues in relation to the 
nature of the estate of the deceased, and its administration, as 
well as of resolution of competing proprietary interests.
53   Note for example the joint declaration of John Howard and Tony Blair 
to that effect, as referred to in Guidance for the Care of Human Remains in 
Museums, above n 50.
54   Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) s 4. 
55   Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) 
s 20 states that any remains that are found must be returned to an 
appropriate Aboriginal.  Section 21 then states that if there is no such 
person, the remains are to be transferred to a ‘prescribed authority’ for 
safe keeping.    
56   Section 4(1).
57   Re An Application by the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre Inc [2007] TASSC 5.
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D  Administration of Estates
Prior to the application for an injunction in the High Court of 
England on 12 February 2007 to prevent the Natural History 
Museum from carrying out tests until the court heard the full 
case in March, an application was made to the Tasmanian 
Supreme Court.58  This application involved the TAC seeking 
letters of administration, that is, an authority from the court 
that gives powers of administration where a person has not 
left a valid will.
Chief Justice Underwood noted that the relevant Act, the 
Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), conferred jurisdiction 
on the court to grant such letters with respect to the estates 
of deceased persons who had died both before and after the 
enactment of the Act.59 Therefore, even though the persons in 
question had died more than 150 years earlier,60 they were still 
covered by the Act. However, as His Honour pointed out, the 
principal stumbling block in the present case was that there was 
‘no evidence that any of the deceased had any estate’.61 While 
accepting that the power to order letters of administration was 
unfettered, there was a question as to the point in making the 
order if there was no estate.62
In regard to the question of property rights in the human body, 
his Honour referred to Doodeward v Spence63 as authority that 
under common law there could not be possession in a body. 
His Honour, however, also quoted Griffith CJ in regard to the 
fact that it does not then follow that ‘from the mere fact that a 
human body is not the subject of ownership that it is forever 
incapable of having an owner’.64  Underwood CJ also referred 
to Smith v Tamworth City Council65 and the conclusion of Young 
 
 
58   Ibid [1].
59   Ibid [4].
60   Ibid [1].
61   Ibid [4]. 
62   Ibid [8].
63 (1908) 6 CLR 406.
64   Ibid 412. 
65   (1997) 41 NSWLR 680.
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J in that case ‘that the law in New South Wales was that a body 
may be regarded as property ”so far as to entitle the next of kin 
to legal protection from unnecessary disturbance and violation 
or invasion of its place of burial”’.66 Underwood CJ then added 
that Young J had stated ‘that although the common law did 
not recognise property in a body, equity would intervene to 
protect the licence to bury the body’.67
Chief Justice Underwood then held that ‘there was sufficient 
doubt here about the nature of an interest in the remains of the 
17 Tasmanian Aboriginals and their burial to justify the grant 
of the letters of administration to enable the administrator to 
test, if necessary, the proprietorial right to the remains for the 
purpose of burial’.68 
On this basis, his Honour ordered that the TAC be appointed as 
the administrator of the estates of the 17 deceased Tasmanian 
Aboriginals whose remains were in the Natural History 
Museum.69  He was satisfied that it had:
a real interest in seeing that the remains get a proper burial in 
accordance with customary law.  It has championed that cause 
for a long time and … because of the lack of identification, 
there is no better grantee.70 
The role of administrator, however, was limited to 
commencement of legal proceedings to seek the return of the 
remains or preventing disturbance to them; taking possession 
of the remains; and providing the deceased a proper burial in 
accordance with Aboriginal law and custom.71 
E  Using Remains for Science
While the TAC may have obtained judicially recognised 
 
66   Ibid 691.
67   Re An Application by the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre Inc [2007] TASSC 5, 
[9]. 
68   Ibid [10].
69   Ibid [12].
70   Ibid [11]. 
71   Ibid [12]. 
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control as the administrator of the 17 remains, the Museum 
had already effectively conceded the TAC’s right to the 
remains – the sticking point was (and remains) therefore the 
final scientific testing of the remains.
The attitude of the English Courts to the matter of testing 
remains has recently been raised in the case of Re St Mary, 
Sledmere.72 This case involved an application for the 
exhumation of Sir Mark Sykes and Lady Edith Sykes for the 
purposes of testing Sir Mark’s tissue samples.  Sir Mark died 
in 1919 of Spanish flu and the petitioner in this case, a world 
renowned researcher into bird flu, sought to use data from the 
tissue samples (if there were any remaining) to ‘unravel the 
genetic structure of the virus’.73 Lady Edith’s body was buried 
on top of Sir Mark’s and therefore had to be exhumed to 
provide access to Sir Mark’s coffin.  Importantly, the surviving 
members of the family of the deceased had all consented to 
the exhumation.  The petitioner however needed to overcome 
the law’s presumption against exhumation. Two other recent 
decisions on exhumation were discussed by the court,74 and 
these three cases together illustrate the rigorous methodology 
of the court in relation to the taking of tissue samples from 
interred remains.  
The court firstly establishes, as the norm, that the Christian 
doctrine that burial in consecrated ground is final and 
permanent.75  On this basis, the applicant is required to show 
some special case warranting a deviation from the norm.  This 
must be a ‘cogent and compelling case for the legitimacy of 
proposed research’ which could rest on national or historic 
importance or scientific experimentation.76 The court then 
had to weigh the public benefit that may ensue from the 
research.
72   [2007] 3 All ER 75.
73   Ibid [2].
74   In re Holy Trinity, Bosham [2004] Fam 125; In re St Nicholas, Sevenoaks 
[2005] 1 WLR 1011.
75   Re St Mary Sledmere [2007] 3 All ER 75, [13].
76   Ibid.
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In looking at the evidence, the judge was concerned that there 
was no guarantee that Sir Mark’s coffin would yield any tissue 
sample at all.  The quality of the tissue could only be assessed 
on opening the coffin, but to allow exhumation the court must 
first be satisfied of public benefit.77 There was no guarantee 
of a public benefit though, because of the uncertainty as to 
the existence of tissue to sample. In addition, the scientist was 
only testing a theory and the result of course could not be 
known in advance – there was no possibility of demonstrating 
incontestably a public benefit on this basis.78  
The court was prepared though to accept grounds for 
exhumation of lesser weight as the purpose of exhumation 
was scientific, and in particular, this may result in treatment 
of ‘dangerous diseases’.79 In this case, the court found the 
grounds were exceptional on the basis that they were to carry 
out ‘legitimate scientific research’ and that ‘proving or negating 
the theories advanced by [the petitioner], will advance the 
capability of others to combat the H5N1 virus’.80 Thus there 
was no need to show that the research would directly lead to a 
cure for bird flu, as simply closing off a line of inquiry would 
bring an overall public benefit.
It is relevant to note that ecclesiastical law, cited in Re St 
Mary, Sledmere,81 affirms the legally recognised ‘protection 
of the [Anglican] Church … to all burials performed by the 
Church of England and the pre-Reformation Church on 
consecrated ground, which does not lapse upon their removal 
to a museum’.82  That is, the Christian norm is recognised and 
 
77  Ibid [18].
78 Ibid [17].
79   Ibid [20].
80   Ibid [21].
81   [2007] 3 All ER 75.
82   Submission No 12 to Working Group on Human Remains (above n 3), (Dr 
Joseph Evans, Archaeological Officer, Council for the Care of Churches, 
on behalf of the Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England). The 
submission refers to Council for Care of Churches, Church Archaeology: 
Its Care and Management (1999), also cited in Re St Mary, Sledmere [2007] 
3 All ER 75.
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protected by the Courts. The law affords protection to these 
Christian burials. This raises the issue of the extent to which 
the law is prepared to recognise the sanctity of non-Church of 
England burials, or burials other than those on consecrated 
grounds and the parties seeking to be the guardians of those 
human remains.  This amounts to a human rights issue and to 
equality before the law, although an in depth analysis of these 
issues is outside the scope of this paper.
While the cases discussed above were required to decide on 
exhumation rather than simply dealing with tissue, they do 
demonstrate, in general terms, a framework within which 
courts can deal with such matters – including the means of 
providing a norm against which to measure a legal response 
to dealing with human remains.  Without going into human 
rights issues, it is submitted that this framework can be 
applied by analogy in relation to the remains of the 17 
Tasmanians where the norm instead is that of Aboriginal 
spiritual practice; where the consent of living descendents is a 
relevant factor; and where a substantial scientific contribution 
will be made towards a significant public benefit.  In respect 
of the latter, it would seem that general research on human 
remains without identifying a particular public benefit, would 
not be sufficient.
Likewise, the Human Tissue Act provides a framework within 
which a decision on testing the remains can be made. The Act 
requires the Human Tissue Authority, established under the 
Act, to operate in dealing with samples post mortem with 
consent,83 and to establish codes relating to (amongst other 
things) ‘communication with the family of the deceased 
in relation to the making of a post-mortem examination’.84 
The Authority is required to gain consent from those in a 
‘qualifying relationship’85 with the deceased.
 
 
83   Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) s 26(3).
84   Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) s 26(2)(e).
85   Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) s 27(1).
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The Report of the Working Group on Human Remains points 
out that:
Consent is either present or absent.  To accept this logical 
premise is not to decry the value of research, but merely to 
place it in context. The choice lies between abrogating the 
principle of consent in specific cases, or accepting that consent 
cannot be compromised or displaced by proof of collateral 
benefits.86
While these issues may be addressed in the Human Tissue Act 
in relation to more recently deceased remains, the Act has 
failed to make provision for cases such as the 17 Tasmanians 
since, as noted above, these remains are not covered by the 
Act. However the tenor of its provisions provides a clear 
framework (if not a legal framework) for dealing with 
human remains, in particular in light of the Report. As the 
Museum is given power to allow repatriation, the argument 
in favour of repatriation without testing is a strong one. 
From a legal perspective, the court has open to it sufficiently 
analogous law to put a heavy onus on the Museum to justify 
its position.
F  The English High Court Challenge
The week following the application to the Tasmanian Supreme 
Court, an injunction was granted by the English High Court 
that prevented the Museum from carrying out tests before 
the matter was to be decided by the court. The hearing was 
due to take place in early March, but attempts were made to 
settle the matter by means of mediation.87  Subsequently, on 
27 April 2007, four remains were repatriated and negotiations 
commenced for the repatriation for the remaining 13.88  
86   Report of the Working Group on Human Remains, above n 3, 152.
87 See eg European Network for Indigenous Australian Rights, ‘Natural 
History Museum agrees to Aboriginal remains talks’ (2 March 2007) 
<http://www.eniar.org/news/repat60.html> at 9 March 2007.
88   European Network for Indigenous Australian Rights ,‘Aborigines 
are able to collect human remains now scientists at Natural History 
Museum have finished testing them’ (27 April 2007) <http://www.
eniar.org/news/repat63.html> at 29 January 2009.
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Even to the extent that the matter has been settled by means 
of mediation, the case has still raised questions as to rights in 
regard to repatriation and the control by indigenous people of 
the remains of their ancestors, as well as the related moral and 
ethical issues.    
IV   The Moral and Ethical Issues
In Tasmania v Commonwealth,89 Justice Murphy discussed the 
responsibility that Australia had to the humanity of the world 
as a justification to override state rights, and so protect the 
World Heritage listed wilderness in Tasmania. His Honour 
stated that the world’s cultural and natural heritage was 
also ‘the heritage of Australians, as part of humanity, as well 
as the heritage of those where the various items happen to 
be’.90  In turn, the area in question in the case, the Tasmanian 
wilderness around the Gordon and Franklin Rivers, became 
declared a part of world heritage, and its preservation justified 
with reference to Australia’s external affairs.  Thus, there was 
a legal basis for the protection of the World Heritage listed 
Tasmanian wilderness. His Honour further noted that with the 
rapid depletion of the world’s forests in the decades to come 
and its subsequent effect on the biosphere may mean that the 
survival of all living creatures could become endangered.  In 
such a scenario the external affairs power could be used to 
prevent the destruction of any forest.91  
This is a judgment which borders on the prophetic, considering 
the world’s present pressing need for all countries to work 
together, across national and jurisdictional boundaries for the 
good of humanity in order to combat climate change brought 
about by human interference in the biosphere. So should 
Justice Murphy’s call that some rights and considerations 
be submerged to the overall benefit of humanity be applied 
to the question of the repatriation of human remains that 
 
 
89   (1983) 158 CLR 1.
90   Ibid 172. 
91   Ibid 171. 
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are presently held by museums? Or should they not only be 
returned, but returned in a way that complies with the wishes 
of the indigenous peoples affected? 
The last decade has seen the scientific community involved in 
tracing the connections between the various human groups in 
the world through the human genome project, which in itself, 
has created its own legal and ethical questions.  It, too, was a 
project that involved the DNA testing of indigenous people.92 
Museums clearly have a role to play in respect of the scientific 
value of human remains, and for the benefits which such 
inquiry may produce for humanity.93 This could be seen as 
particularly relevant in regard to a group like the Tasmanian 
Aborigines who, from a global perspective, are a unique group 
of people within the sea of humanity.  This has to be balanced 
against the respect a museum must place on the diversity of 
beliefs concerning the importance of the remains of ancestors, 
and the way in which they should be treated after death in 
order to comply with the religious and cultural beliefs of the 
indigenous people concerned. Within Western culture the 
deep concern of Christians for a Christian burial is evident 
from the case law.94 
Thus, in regard to the 17 Tasmanian remains, TAC legal advisor 
Michael Mansell has described the Natural History Museum’s 
attempts to carry out various tests as ‘an act of spite by mad 
scientists’.95 To Mansell and other Tasmanian Aborigines, any 
such tests will adversely affect the spiritual aspects of the 
deceased, by interfering in the traditional burial ceremony 




92   See Josephine Thornton, ‘Congratulations to the ‘inventors’ of our 
genes’ (2002) 6(1) Newcastle Law Review 77; Jennifer French, ‘Something 
is Rotten in the state of Iceland: deCODE Genetics, Population Research 
and Informed Consent’, (2006) 24 Law in Context 113.     
93 Report of the Working Group on Human Remains, above n 3.
94   See eg Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406.
95   Denholm, above n 1, 17. 
96   Ibid. For descriptions of spiritual dimensions of burial see also Prue 
Vines, ‘Resting in Peace? A Comparison of the Legal Control of Bodily 
Remains in Cemeteries and Aboriginal Burial Grounds in Australia’ 
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The opposing view has been expressed by Professor Colin 
Groves from the Australian National University, who is of 
the opinion that such tests could be of significant value to 
research into human diversity and evolution. However, he also 
accepts that such a decision should be one that is left to the 
Tasmanian Aborigines.97 It is perhaps this view that should 
also be accepted by the Natural History Museum.  
V Conclusion
Depending on one’s perspective, the question of whether 
a museum can carry out tests on human remains either 
requires groups like the TAC to establish a right at law to stop 
the tests, or the museum to establish a right to carry them 
out. No property right, however, appears to exist in the 
remains either under statute or the common law, to form the 
foundation for either argument. As Magnusson points out, 
so long as proprietary rights are not recognised in the tissue 
associated with Aboriginal remains, then the Aboriginal 
community will not be able to gain exclusive possession and 
control of the remains.98 Therefore, as the possessors of the 
remains, the rights lie with the Natural History Museum.  
There is however the possibility of an alternative framework 
for an argument outside of property interests on the basis 
of analogising from the tests cited in Re St Mary, Sledmere.99 
In that case the parties will need to argue on the basis of 
establishment of a norm relating to human remains, public 
benefit of interference with remains, and the interests of 
descendants of those remains. The museum’s claims that 
testing would be for the ‘benefit of humanity’ would in 
fact be put to the test, within a legal framework, and 
having regard to the context of the testing. Such a framework 
 
 
 (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 78; Submission No 2 to Working Group 
on Human Remains (above n 3), ‘Indigenous Australian People, Their 
Defence of the Dead and Native Title’ (Paul Turnbull).
97   Denholm, above n 1. 
98 Magnusson, above n 38, 613. 
99   [2007] 3 All ER 75.
Newc LR Vol 11 The Story of Seventeen Tasmanians
NLR vol 11 #c.indd   163 8/11/10   12:08:02 AM
164
would validate the norms of organisations such as TAC. 
The risk for the TAC implicit in this framework is of course 
that the Museum would meet the public benefit test. In 
light of the specificity of the testing and possible benefit 
required in Re St Mary, Sledmere however, the general nature 
of the public benefit claims may well not be sufficient.
In spite of any apparent gains made by Indigenous 
Australians in recent years in the fight to repatriate their 
ancestral remains, it should be noted that an estimated several 
thousand remains have still not been repatriated.100 Therefore, 
some of the questions raised in regard to the remains of the 
17 Tasmanians will continue to surface in relation to the other 
remains that were also removed from their tribal lands. 
One positive legal aspect that has emerged from the case is 
that the Tasmanian Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
the TAC is the right group to control the burial of the remains 
once they are returned. This will, for instance, prevent the 
problem that occurred in Western Australia where a 20 year 
struggle saw the repatriation of the skull of Yagan, a Nyoongar 
warrior, in 1997. Upon the skull’s return, differences of 
opinion within the Aboriginal community have prevented 
a final burial from taking place.101 The Tasmanian decision 
is also an acknowledgment that modern Aborigines are 
entitled to control of the remains of their ancestors in regard to 
burials and an implied acknowledgement of the importance 
people hold in burying their dead according to cultural and 
religious beliefs.  This idea is supported also throughout the 
Report of the Working Group on Human Remains.102  
The debate on repatriation and testing of remains centres 
on respect for the dead.  If the capacity for reverence and 
 
100   Pia Akerman, ‘Aboriginal remains in red tape limbo’, The Australian, 5 
March 2007, 7. 
101   Denholm, above n 1, 17. 
102   See eg above, n 3, 28, 79 etc.
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ritual of the dead is a defining feature of humanity,103 then 
the rigours the law applies to interference with Christian 
burials and the remains of Christians should likewise apply 
to non-Christians regardless of any arguments about property 
interests in human remains. On this argument, indigenous 
groups, like the TAC, have the right to control the remains of 
their ancestors as a reflection of their humanity. 
103   For a general discussion of human burial see Mike Parker Pearson, The 
Archaeology of Death and Burial (2002) 142, 145-6.  For a specific example 
of archaeological evidence of respect for the dead see P Murial, B 
Maureille, D Peresinotto and F Geus, ‘An infant cemetery of the Classic 
Kerma Period (1750-1500 BC)’ (2004) 78 Antiquity 267, 275.  
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